Russia is for space “free of weapons of any kind,” said G.M. Gatilov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN Office in Geneva and to other international organizations, in a UN speech Jan. 27, 2021.

“The only way to protect humanity is to conclude a legally binding agreement with the participation of all space-significant states, providing for a ban on the placement of weapons in outer space and the use of force or threat of force against space objects. Back in 2008, we with our Chinese partners proposed a draft of such an agreement (DPROK), and in 2014 it was updated taking into account the considerations of other delegations.”

Speaking at the plenary session of the UN Conference on Disarmament In Geneva on January 27, 2021, he said Russia aims at “solving the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space. We propose and promote concrete practical measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. The only way to protect humanity is to conclude a legally binding agreement with the participation of all space-significant states, providing for a ban on the placement of weapons in outer space and the use of force or threat of force against space objects.

“Back in 2008, we, with our Chinese partners, proposed a draft of such an agreement (DPROK), and in 2014 it was updated, taking into account the considerations of other delegations.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 

January  27, 2021

Speech by the Permanent Representative of Russia to the UN and other international organizations in Geneva G.M. Gatilov at the plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament

123-27-01-2021

Dear Mr. Chairman, Dear Colleagues,

First of all, I would like to congratulate the Permanent Representative of Belgium, Ambassador M. Pexten, on assuming the chairmanship of the Conference on Disarmament. You, like all the other Presidents of the 2021 session, can count on constructive interaction with the Russian delegation. I would like to wish all of us good luck.

Mr. Chairman, The representative of the Russian delegation at the opening of the Conference has already touched upon the main points that, in our opinion, should be paid attention to when organizing work in the context of the ongoing pandemic. I will not repeat myself. I will only emphasize that our delegation is in favor of the CD functioning this year on the basis of a prepared plan, i.e. more predictable and consistent than 2020. We believe that it is possible to achieve this, even in difficult conditions of financial constraints and an epidemiological situation.

We are firmly convinced that the delegations to the Conference have at their disposal all the necessary tools in order to start effective substantive work: this is the already approved agenda and the Forum’s Rules of Procedure. Despite the limited composition of the Kyrgyz Republic, participation of any UN member state is envisaged in its activities. This is their inalienable right. Such a guarantee was fixed in the Rules of Procedure so that our forum does not become a closed club, and the security interests of other states are taken into account during the negotiations. We intend to continue to adhere to this principled and consistent position and call on all other delegations to do so.

Change something in the so-called. We consider the methods of functioning of the CD not only inappropriate, but also counterproductive. Otherwise, procedural or technical differences will be added to the substantive differences. It will be almost impossible to get out of this vicious circle, and the CD will be mired in arguments and squabbles for a long time.

And against the background of the degrading situation in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation (KVRN), the inaction of the CD cannot but depress. Tensions and unpredictability persist, old and new threats and challenges are aggravated, military and political factors undermining global strategic stability are increasing. The foundation with such difficulty, brick by brick, in the architecture of agreements in the field of international security was practically destroyed.

It is this diagnosis of the state of affairs in the field of KVRN made by the overwhelming majority of the delegations who spoke at the opening of the session. At the same time, voices were voiced about the need in these unfavorable conditions for a constructive agenda and initiatives that contribute to rapprochement and confidence-building and aimed at a respectful and equal dialogue. We fully share this opinion and are open to such interaction with all states. Moreover, in recent years Russia has come up with a number of important initiatives in the field of KVRN, which can just be regarded as a significant part of such a positive international agenda. On this score, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke unequivocally at the opening of the 75th session of the UN General Assembly.

We are also ready to continue our systematic conversation with the United States on the strategic agenda. We talked about this many times. We are convinced that the first step in this direction should be the unconditional extension of the START Treaty, which ensures strategic predictability, exerts a stabilizing influence on a global scale, and also makes a significant contribution to the process of nuclear disarmament.

In this regard, the recent statements by representatives of the new US Administration in favor of extending the START Treaty for five years are encouraging. This attitude is welcome. Moscow is ready, without delay, to make contact through the foreign ministries of Russia and the United States for the earliest possible execution of such an agreement.

The time won by prolonging the START Treaty would allow Russia and the United States to seriously engage in a joint search for answers to the questions that are now emerging in the field of international security and strategic stability. It would also need to be used to launch comprehensive Russian-American negotiations on the outlines of future nuclear missile arms control, with the obligatory consideration of all factors affecting strategic stability.

We presented our vision of a new “security equation” that could form the basis of such negotiations to our American colleagues. Our concept implies the development of an understanding or agreements on the control of offensive and defensive weapons in nuclear and non-nuclear equipment, capable of solving strategic tasks. This also includes, among other things, the development of common approaches to solving the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space. The implementation of these proposals would help restore trust between the two leading nuclear states and, accordingly, significantly improve the international atmosphere.

In the context of the collapse of the INF Treaty, in order to maintain predictability to maintain a “window of opportunity” for dialogue, Russia declared a moratorium on the deployment of ground-based INF Treaty systems in regions where similar American-made systems will not appear, and also proposed specific options for verification measures to address existing concerns. A reasonable response from the US and NATO to this would be a similar counter-moratorium. I would like to remind you of the statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 26, 2020 on additional steps to de-escalate the situation in Europe in the context of the termination of the INF Treaty. We are ready to continue efforts to minimize the negative consequences of the collapse of the INF Treaty, which happened through no fault of ours. Unfortunately, so far the United States and NATO member countries prefer to view this problem through the prism of political (national and group) attitudes, and not from the point of view of the need to strengthen regional and global security and maintain strategic stability.

Mr. Chairman,

We are confident that under the current conditions, the stable functioning of the NPT and the protection of its integrity are becoming increasingly important. To do this, it is necessary to unite the efforts of all parties to the Treaty, which could work together to strengthen its three components (non-proliferation, disarmament, peaceful use of atomic energy) in their harmonious relationship. We are convinced that the measures laid down in the 2010 Action Plan remain fully relevant. We consider it important that states reaffirm their commitment to the commitments made during the previous review cycles of the Treaty. We are ready to interact with all partners in the interests of constructive and non-confrontational OK.

The agenda of our Conference provides an excellent opportunity to make a significant contribution to the successful implementation of the 10th NPT OC. This would be facilitated, in the first place, by a comprehensive consideration of its items 1 “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament” and 2 “Prevention of nuclear war, including all related issues.”

I would like to note that Russia timely, back in March, submitted its national report on the implementation of the NPT. This is one of the testimonies of our country’s commitment to compliance with its obligations and the goals set forth in the Treaty. This, of course, is primarily about achieving a world free of nuclear and other types of WMD.

Russia has made a significant contribution to the process of nuclear disarmament, including the full implementation of previously concluded agreements in this area. Further progress in this direction should be carried out in strict accordance with Article VI of the NPT. It can only be phased, based on the adoption of consensus decisions that take into account the interests of all countries and lead to the consolidation of international peace and stability while strengthening the security of all states without exception.

The approach taken by those who adhere to the policy of forcing the nuclear states to abandon their nuclear arsenals does not meet such universal criteria without taking into account their legitimate defense interests and existing strategic realities.

An example of such an erroneous approach is the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), developed on a non-inclusive and non-consensual basis. It creates tensions among members of the international community and undermines the credibility of the NPT and the nuclear non-proliferation system based on it.

We reiterate that the NPT was developed without taking into account the fundamental principles underlying the NPT, which should be applied consistently and without distortion. The NPT is not capable of making a practical contribution to the process of limiting and reducing nuclear arms. It does not establish any new standards or norms and does not contribute to the development of customary international law. Its entry into force in this sense does not change anything.

We believe that an alternative to this approach is the launch of discussions on the KVRN topics and nuclear disarmament issues, in particular, in a multilateral format. Such a conversation should be conducted on the basis of consensus decision-making that guarantees the viability and effectiveness of the international instruments being developed, taking into account the legitimate interests of all parties, without external pressure or coercion. Over the past years, the Russian delegation has consistently called for the start of such substantive discussions in the CD, which is the optimal platform for this.

We reaffirm our principled position that progress towards a nuclear-free world and general and complete disarmament is possible only if the full range of factors affecting global security is taken into account. By the way, the founding fathers of the Kyrgyz Republic shared the same systemic vision of the situation in the field of international security, thanks to which the agenda of our forum is complex in nature. It also provides for solving the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space.

Russia is for space free of weapons of any kind. We propose and promote concrete practical measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. The only way to protect humanity is to conclude a legally binding agreement with the participation of all space-significant states, providing for a ban on the placement of weapons in outer space and the use of force or threat of force against space objects. Back in 2008, we with our Chinese partners proposed a draft of such an agreement (DPROK), and in 2014 it was updated taking into account the considerations of other delegations.

It is obvious that the current difficult realities in international relations, the reflection of which we observe in the work of our Conference, do not yet allow us to move on to negotiations on the PPWM and a number of other issues on the CD agenda. Therefore, in 2016, we suggested to our colleagues at this stage to tackle a less ambitious, but no less useful task for the world community – to develop a convention on this platform to combat acts of chemical and biological terrorism. This task does not contradict the fundamental interests of national security of any of the countries, at the same time, the practical return on its implementation would be very great.

In our opinion, such a convention, the draft elements of which we have presented to our partners in the Conference, would significantly increase the effectiveness of international legal instruments in the field of combating such evil as WMD terrorism.

Dear Mr. Chairman,

In my speech, I touched upon only the most pressing problems of international security. The Russian delegation is ready for in-depth substantive interaction on all topics of the CD agenda with all delegations.

Thanks for attention.

SOURCE: https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/26012021RFGennady-Gatilov.pdf